

Message Text

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ACTION IO-14

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SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03
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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0566
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN
AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 01323

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

LONDON PLEASE PASS TO AMB YOUNG

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PORG, SF, WA
SUBJECT: DRAFT MESSAGE FOR USE IN APPROACHES TO
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SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS

REF: A. USUN 01286 (NOTAL), B. USUN 901 (NOTAL)

1. DURING CONTACT GROUP MEETING OF APRIL 7, GROUP
DISCUSSED PROPOSED APPROACHES (REF A) TO THOSE SECURITY
COUNCIL MEMBERS WHO HAVE NOT ALREADY BEEN APPROACHED ON

NAMIBIA: NAMELY, CARACAS, KUWAIT, LA PAZ, MOSCOW, PEKING, PORT LOUIS, AND PRAGUE. GROUP AGREED AD REFERENDUM ON DRAFT WRITTEN MESSAGE (SEE PARA 3 BELOW) FOR USE IN APPROACHES TO BE MADE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN CARACAS, KUWAIT, LA PAZ, AND PORT LOUIS. MESSAGE IS ADAPTED FROM MESSAGE USED PREVIOUSLY WITH FRONTLINE STATES (REF B). GROUP WILL DISCUSS ON APRIL 10 FORMAT AND SUBSTANCE OF APPROACHES TO MOSCOW, PEKING, AND PRAGUE, IN LIGHT OF GUIDANCE FROM MOSCOW AND PEKING (REF A). APPROACHES COULD THEN BE MADE IN LATER THREE CAPITALS ON APRIL 11 OR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER.

2. BRITISH HAVE MENTIONED THAT THEIR AMB IN TEHRAN HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO APPROACH THE SHAH DURING W-EK OF APRIL 10 TO URGE HIS SUPPORT OF THE PROPOSAL AND TO URGE HIM TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TO ENCOURAGE SOUTH AFRICAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL. THE BRITISH HAVE ASKED IF THE OTHER FOUR WISH TO JOIN IN SUCH A DEMARCHE. BRITISH ADVISED THAT APPROACH TO SHAH WOULD BE ORAL ONLY AND SUGGESTED THAT SUBSTANCE OF MESSAGE FOR USE IN CARACAS, ETC. COULD BE USED AS BACKGROUND. WE AGREED, AS DID OTHER THREE, THAT SUCH A DEMARCHE COULD BE HELPFUL AND STATED THAT WE WOULD REFER BRITISH REQUEST TO DEPARTMENT. (USUN IS REPEATING TEXT OF WESTERN FIVE PROPOSAL TO TEHRAN FOR POST'S INFORMATION. WE ASSUME THAT BRITISH WILL BE PROVIDING TEXT OF PROPOSAL TO SHAH IF THEY HAVE

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NOT DONE SO ALREADY.)

3. TEXT OF DRAFT MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

1. THROUGHOUT THE PAST YEAR OUR FIVE GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY WORKING TO ACHIEVE AN INTERNATIONALLY-ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE NAMIBIAN QUESTION CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 385. IN THIS EFFORT REPRESENTATIVES OF OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE MET ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT, SWAPO, AND OTHER PARTIES PRINCIPALLY CONCERNED. IN EARLY FEBRUARY OUR GOVERNMENTS PRESENTED THE PARTIES WITH A PROPOSAL OF OURS FOR A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE NAMIBIAN QUESTION, AND LATER IN THE MONTH OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS HELD TWO DAYS OF MEETING IN NEW YORK WITH THE PARTIES.

2. AT THOSE MEETINGS, AND IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION SINCE THEN, A NUMBER OF POINTS ABOUT OUR PROPOSAL WERE RAISED. SOME WERE MATTERS OF DRAFTING; OTHERS WERE MORE SUBSTANTIVE. OUR FIVE GOVERNMENTS HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED EVERY POINT THAT WAS RAISED, AND HAVE MADE SOME AMENDMENTS TO CLARIFY THE TEXT. WE HAVE NOW PRESENTED

THE REVISED PROPOSAL TO THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED
AND HAVE FORMALLY TRANSMITTED THE PROPOSAL TO THE SECURITY
COUNCIL FOR CIRCULATION AS AN OFFICIAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DOCUMENT. IT HAS THE UNRESERVED BACKING OF OUR FIVE
GOVERNMENTS, AND WE BELIEVE THAT IT CAN BRING ABOUT A
RAPID AND PEACEFUL END TO THIS LONG-STANDING DISPUTE. WE
HOPE THAT YOU WILL SUPPORT IT, AND THAT THE SECURITY
COUNCIL WILL ACT UPON IT.

3. IT MAY BE HELPFUL IF WE EXPLAIN THE THINKING

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CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

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BEHIND OUR PROPOSAL. WE BELIEVE IT IS FULLY CONSISTENT
WITH RESOLUTION 385, WHILE OF NECESSITY TAKING INTO
ACCOUNT THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVED IN THE DECOLO-
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NIZATION OF NAMIBIA. SO FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, SOUTH
AFRICA'S PRESENCE IN NAMIBIA IS ILLEGAL AND SHOULD BE
ENDED. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE TO RECOGNISE THE FACTS
OF LIFE; SOUTH AFRICA CONTROLS NAMIBIA, AND HAS DONE SO
FOR SIXTY YEARS. WE HAVE CHOSEN THE PATH OF NEGOTIATION,
AND WE CANNOT NEGOTIATE SOUTH AFRICA'S UNCONDITIONAL
SURRENDER.

4. WHAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED, HOWEVER, IS AGREEMENT
UPON VERY SUBSTANTIAL UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT DURING
THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WILL
HAVE A DECISIVE INFLUENCE OVER THE POLITICAL PROCESS, AND
HIS CIVILIAN AND MILITARY STAFF WILL BE CONSIDERABLE IN
SIZE. WHILE WE HAVE LEFT IT UP TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
TO DECIDE WHAT IS NECESSARY, GIVEN THE REQUIREMENTS OF
THE TASK, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THIS OPERATION WILL BE
ONE OF THE LARGEST THAT THE UNITED NATIONS HAS MOUNTED.
ALL LEVELS OF THE ADMINISTRATION, THE POLICE, AND THE
SMALL RESIDUAL SOUTH AFRICAN FORCE, WILL COME UNDER THE
CLOSE SUPERVISION OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S STAFF.
IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE
SOUTH AFRICANS OR INDEED ANY PARTY COULD DELIBERATELY
VIOLATE THE AGREEMENT WITHOUT BRINGING DOWN UPON THEM-
SELVES THE CONDEMNATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.
ONCE A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE HAS BEEN INSTALLED IN
NAMIBIA, LIFE IN THAT TERRITORY CAN NEVER BE THE
SAME AGAIN. WE SHALL HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT A BREAK WITH THE
DISCRIMINATION OF THE PAST, AND PAVED THE WAY, WE HOPE,
FOR A PEACEFUL AND DEMOCRATIC FUTURE.

5. FOUR MAIN AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
PARTIES REMAINED AFTER THE NEW YORK TALKS. THE RELATION-
SHIP BETWEEN THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THE
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ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL, REPRESENTING THE DE FACTO ADMINI-
STRATION OF NAMIBIA, WILL CLEARLY BE OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE.
WE ARE ANXIOUS TO AVOID RESURRECTING THE LEGAL DISPUTES
OVER NAMIBIA THAT HAVE SO LONG BEDEVILLED CONSIDERATION
OF THIS QUESTION. WE SEE THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AS

HAVING TWO MAIN ROLES. HE WILL BE THE WATCHDOG OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND THE GUARANTOR THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT WILL BE RESPECTED BY SOUTH AFRICA AND BY ALL PARTIES. NO PROPOSAL AFFECTING THE POLITICAL PROCESS CAN BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT HIS AGREEMENT. WE HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT HE WILL ALSO BUILD UP A WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL, SO THAT, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, DISPUTES BETWEEN THE TWO OFFICIALS CAN BE SETTLED PRIVATELY AND INFORMALLY. WHILE THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST REMAIN VIGILANT TO ENSURE THAT THE AGREEMENT IS RESPECTED, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD BE LEFT TO GET ON WITH HIS JOB, USING THE BROAD TERMS OF REFERENCE WITH WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL ENTRUSTS HIM.

6. THE PROPOSAL OF OUR FIVE GOVERNMENTS CALLS FOR THE RETENTION OF A RESIDUAL SOUTH AFRICAN FORCE OF 1500 IN NAMIBIA UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS. WE DO NOT SEE HOW SUCH A SMALL FORCE, RESTRICTED TO BASE AND CLOSELY MONITORED BY UNITED NATIONS MILITARY PERSONNEL, CAN POSSIBLY REPRESENT A THREAT TO THE FREEDOM OF THE ELECTION PROCESS. WHILE WE THINK IT NECESSARY TO MAKE THIS GESTURE TO SOUTH AFRICA, IT IS ALSO THE CASE THAT SOUTH AFRICA'S PRESENT MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN NAMIBIA IS CERTAINLY OVER 20,000, AND ACCORDING TO SWAPO MAY BE AS HIGH AS 50,000. WE CANNOT ACCEPT SWAPO'S PROPOSAL THAT THE RESIDUAL FORCE SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO BASE AT KARASBURG. THIS IS TANTAMOUNT TO DEMANDING ITS COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL, AND WOULD BE UNNECESSARY, GIVEN THE MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS THAT WE PROPOSE. WE DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THAT SECTION OF OUR PROPOSAL WHICH DEALT WITH THE POLICE,
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WHERE WE HAVE TRIED TO MEET LEGITIMATE CONCERNS ABOUT THEIR CONDUCT, AND ABOUT THE NEED TO MONITOR THEIR ACTIVITIES CAREFULLY.

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7. AS REGARDS THE SIZE OF THE UN MILITARY CONTINGENT
WE REMAIN OF THE VIEW THAT WE SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO IMPOS
AN ARBITRARY FIGURE, BUT SHOULD LEAVE TO THE SECRETARY-
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GENERAL TO DETERMINE WHAT IS NECESSARY, IN THE LIGHT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE TASK. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, MADE IT
CLEAR THAT OUR FIVE GOVERNMENTS WILL SUPPORT HIS JUDGE-
MENT, AND WE SHALL HONOR THIS COMMITMENT.

8. LASTLY, WE HAVE OMITTED FROM THE PROPOSAL THE
DIFFICULT QUESTION OF WALVIS BAY. WE SEE NO WAY OF SETT-
LING THE QUESTION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIA-
TIONS. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, TOLD THE SOUTH AFRICANS THAT
ALL ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION OF WALVIS BAY SHOULD BE
SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERN-
MENT AND THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT OF NAMIBIA. OUR
REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE

THIS CLEAR IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE HAVE OBTAINED ASSURANCES THAT THE STRENGTH OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCE IN WALVIS BAY WILL NOT BE INCREASED DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, AND THAT NAMIBIANS IN WALVIS BAY WILL BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THE TERRITORY DURING THE TRNASITIONAL PERIOD, INCLUDING VOTING IN THE ELECTIONS.

9. SOME OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR PROPOSAL HAVE CAUSED DIFFICULTY FOR ONE OR OTHER PARTY. IN OUR VIEW, HOWEVER, THEY ARE ALL COMPARATIVELY MINOR MATTERS WHICH MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO OBSTRUCT OUR GOAL OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

10. TURNING TO THE FUTURE, WE BELIEVE THAT WE MUST NOW PROCEED URGENTLY. WE WANT TO AVOID AN "INTERNAL SETTLEMENT" IN NAMIBIA, WITH ALL THE REPERCUSSIONS THAT COULD FOLLOW IN THE AREA. WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN IN RHODESIA HOW INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS, AND RELUCTANCE TO NEGOTIATE, CAN COMPLICATE OUR EFFORTS. DELAY IN PURSUING

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OUR PROPOSAL FOR NAMIBIA WILK SEVERELY AFFECT HOPES OF AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT AT THIS TIME. SUCCESS, ON THE OTHER HAND, COULD HAVE BENEFICIAL REPERCUSSION ELSEWHERE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

11. WHEN OUR REPRESENTATIVES FIRST BEGAN THESE NEGOTIATIONS LAST SPRING, WE HOPED WE COULD MAKE SOME PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT; IN ALL HONESTY WE HAVE PROGRESSED FURTHER THAN WE COULD REASONABLY HAVE EXPECTED. WE ATTACH THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND WE HAVE DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO THEM. WE HOPE WE HAVE CLEARLY INDICATED WHERE WE STAND. IN OUR VIEW, THESE PROPOSALS REPRESENT THE BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR A PEACEFUL TRANSFER OF POWER IN NAMIBIA. WE EXPECT TO CALL FOR A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON NAMIBIA WITHIN A WEEK, AND WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO SUPPORT OUR INITIATIVE. LEONARD

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